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I.

Introduction

Perhaps one of the starkest examples of court failings in music copyright is the recent William v.
Bridgeport Music, Inc. ruling in 2015, also known as the Blurred Lines case.1 In this case,
Pharrell Williams and Robin Thicke preemptively sued the Gaye family and Bridgeport Music,
Inc. for declaratory judgement that “Blurred Lines” did not infringe on Marvin Gaye’s “Got to
Give it Up,” after which the Gaye family countersued to get an infringement judgment.2 The jury
awarded the Gaye family $5.3 million in December 2015, which led to widespread outrage in the
music industry.3 The problem was how the court procedurally reached its verdict. Business
Insider asserts that the jury set a new legal precedent, overturning “traditional legal
understanding of music copyright.”4
Legal scholars have long criticized the merits of copyright, whether it be debating the
benefits of copyright protection, or dissecting the methods courts use to determine illegal
copying.5 Music copyright, in particular, has been debated in a range of scholarly articles whose
authors discuss the problems inherent in applying the boundaries of intellectual copyright
protection on the medium of music. In a 1988 Fordham Law Review article by Michael Der

1

Paul Schrodt, "The $5 million 'Blurred Lines' legal fight over the song's 'vibe' could permanently change the music
industry," Business Insider, accessed March 27, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/blurred-lines-case-musiccopyright-2015-12.
2
Ibid; Pharrell Williams et al v. Bridgeport Music Inc et al, Docket No. 2:13-cv-06004 COMPLAINT accessed
February 12, 2017, http://mcir.usc.edu/inplay/Documents/williamscomplaint.pdf.
3
Eriq Gardner, ""Blurred Lines" Appeal Gets Support From More Than 200 Musicians," The Hollywood Reporter,
Accessed March 27, 2017, http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/blurred-lines-appeal-gets-support-924213.
4
Paul Schrodt, "The $5 million 'Blurred Lines' legal fight over the song's 'vibe' could permanently change the music
industry," Business Insider, accessed March 27, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/blurred-lines-case-musiccopyright-2015-12.
5
Stephen Breyer, “The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer
Programs,” Harvard Law Review 84 (1970); Michelle V. Francis, “Musical Copyright Infringement: The
Replacement of Arnstein v. Porter – A More Comprehensive Use of Expert Testimony and the Implementation of an
“Actual Audience” Test,” Pepperdine Law Review 17 (1990); Wendy J. Gordon, “An Inquiry into the Merits of
Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory,” Stanford Law Review 41 (1989).
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Manuelian6 advances the idea that difficulties in music copyright originate in limitations of
expert testimony.7 Other authors such as Austin Padgett8 in a New Hampshire Law Review
article, 9 and Pamela Samuelson10 in her 2013 Northwestern University Law Review article,11
scrutinize the various tests courts use. The tests that courts use in copyright infringement cases,
whether in subjects like bookkeeping or films, rely on a concept known as the idea-expression
dichotomy. The idea-expression dichotomy is a concept perpetuated by the legal system that
makes a distinction between the idea that underlies a creative work, and the results of that idea as
expressed in a tangible format, such as clearly delineated character in a book.12 The recent
Blurred Lines case has also garnered the attention of legal scholars. For example, Jason Palmer,13
in his 2016 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law article, argues that the
unfortunate results stemmed from the inadequacies of the trier of fact; since the judge or jury
usually does not have any musical training, changing the methodology of an infringement test
will not lead to better outcomes because they will not fully understand the results of any tests.14
Palmer makes a persuasive case that tweaking the tests will not fix the problem. However, I
argue that the idea-expression dichotomy is especially problematic in music copyright because it

6

Michael der Manuelian is currently a contracts lawyer in New York City. A previous version of the cited essay
won the first prize in the 1988 Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition at the Fordham University School of Law
7
Michael Der Manuelian, “The Role of the Expert Witness in Music Copyright Infringement Cases,” Fordham Law
Review 57 (1988): 127-147.
8
Austin Padgett was a J.D. candidate at the Franklin Pierce Law Center as of 2009. The cited article was the
winning entry in the second annual Pierce Law Student Symposium writing competition.
9
Austin Padgett, “The Rhetoric of Predictability: Reclaiming the Lay Ear in Music Copyright Infringement
Litigation,” Pierce Law Review 7 (2008): 125-149.
10
Pamela Samuelson is the Richard M. Sherman '74 Distinguished Professor of Law and Information Management
at the University of California, Berkeley.
11
Pamela Samuelson, “A Fresh Look at Tests for Nonliteral Copyright Infringement,” Northwestern University Law
Review 107 (2013): 1821-1850.
12
Edwards Samuels, “The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law,” Tennessee Law Review 56 (1989): 347349.
13
Jason Palmer is a 2017 J.D. candidate at the Vanderbilt University Law School.
14
Jason Palmer, “‘Blurred Lines’” Means Changing Focus: Juries Composed of Musical Artists Should Decide
Music Copyright Infringement Cases, Not Lay Juries,” Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 18
(2016): 907-934.
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informs how courts create infringement tests and by extension—as seen in the Blurred Lines
case—allows expert witnesses free reign to make any kind of claim in their music analysis.

II. An Overview of Music Copyright

Intellectual property is protected under the United States Constitution.15 The Constitution calls
for the restriction of people’s free usage of a creator’s property so as to promote economic and
creative activities.16 The rationale is that if intellectual property is not protected, artists and
inventors would not produce new creations lest the fruits of their labor be enjoyed without
compensation.17 Of course, this rationale is based on particular perspectives of human
understanding that ignores reasons other than profit, such as personal passion, that one might
produce new works. More recently, the Copyright Act of 1976 explicitly expanded the scope of
an author’s “writing” in order to include other mediums such as software, motion pictures, and
sound recordings—that is, mediums that did not exist when the Founding Fathers wrote the
Constitution.18

US Constitution Article I Section 8 Clause 8. “The Congress shall have power… To promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries.”
16
Ibid.
17
Stephen Breyer, “The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer
Programs,” Harvard Law Review 84 (1970): 291-313; Mazer v. Stein, 347 US 201 (1954). “The economic
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve
rewards commensurate with the services rendered.”
18
17 U.S. Code § 102 (a).
15
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A. Elements of Infringement
1. Ownership

To establish infringement, the plaintiff must prove two components: first, the plaintiff must have
ownership of a valid copyright, and second, the alleged copying must have used protected
material from the copyrighted work.19 According to the American Bar Association, one of the
bases for copyright ownership is “originality in the author” as well as proof of registration of a
valid copyright.20 It should be noted that courts tend to use creativity and originality
synonymously.21 The importance of originality in a copyrighted work cannot be understated; as
the Supreme Court noted in 1954,22 and as was later echoed in 1975,23 the purpose of copyright
law is to spur the creation of new works for the public good. As such, works that do not have
even a modicum of creativity or originality may not be protectable even if a copyright is properly
registered. For example, a defendant may have used a setting reminiscent of a scene in the
plaintiff’s story which, at the same time, might not be considered infringement if the copied
setting was commonplace or at the very least, used in a work that preceded both the plaintiff and
defendant’s work.24 A defendant could also argue that although there are segments that are

Jason E. Sloan, “An Overview of the Elements of a Copyright Infringement Cause of Action – Part I: Introduction
and Copying,” American Bar Association, accessed April 11, 2017,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/elements_of_a_copyr
ight.html.
20
Ibid.
21
Aaron Keyt, “An Improved Framework for Music Plagiarism Litigation,” California Law Review 76 (1988): 428
at note 36; Paul M. Grinvalsky, “Idea-Expression in Musical Analysis and the Role of the Intended Audience in
Music Copyright Infringement,” California Western Law Review 28 (1992): 398-400.
22
Mazer v. Stein, 347 US 201 (1954). “The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ Sacrificial days
devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.”
23
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 US 151 (1975). “The immediate effect of our copyright law is to
secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good.”
24
Richard Jones, “The Myth of Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law,” Pace Law Review 10 (1990): 591.
19
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identical to the original work, the segment appeared in a third work preceding both works,
showing that the relevant portion of the plaintiff’s work was not original and therefore not
protectable.25

2. Copying

To prove copying, the plaintiff has to first show with a preponderance of evidence that the
defendant had access to the original work.26 In lieu of definitive proof of access, a plaintiff can
attempt to prove by implication that the defendant had access by demonstrating that the two
works in question are so similar that the defendant must have copied from the original.27 This
sort of similarity is called substantial similarity. It should be noted that the plaintiff must still
show that the defendant had some possibility of viewing the material. One way this can be
shown is to argue that the original work was so popular that the defendant must have heard of
seen or otherwise witnessed the original work at some point.28 There is also a more stringent
form of similarity called striking similarity which the plaintiff is required to show if there is no
circumstantial evidence that the defendant had access.29 What distinguishes striking and
substantial similarity? Courts are not clear where the line is drawn and they do not try to clarify

25

Ibid., 592.
Palmer, “’Blurred Lines’ Means Changing Focus,” 915.
27
John Autry, “Toward a Definition of Striking Similarity in Infringement Actions for Copyrighted Musical
Works,” Journal of Intellectual Property Law 10 (2002): 113-114.
28
Alice J. Kim, “Expert Testimony and Substantial Similarity: Facing the Music in (Music) Copyright Infringement
Cases,” Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 19 (1994): 111; Jeffrey Cadwell, “Expert Testimony, Scenes a Faire,
and Tonal Music: A (Not So) New Test for Infringement,” Santa Clara Law Review 46 (2005): 140-142; Michelle
V. Francis, “Musical Copyright Infringement: The Replacement of Arnstein v. Porter – A More Comprehensive Use
of Expert Testimony and the Implementation of an “Actual Audience” Test,” Pepperdine Law Review 17 (1990):
502-503.
29
Autry, “Toward a Definition of Striking Similarity,” 115.
26
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the ambiguity.30 However, in music cases, courts tend to rule that there is striking similarity if a
higher proportion of the original work was simply copied, without considering the role of
originality or creativity.31 Harking back to the significance of originality, the Arnstein case
discussed in the following section helped to form a distinction between misappropriation and
merely copying in music copyright cases.

B. Arnstein & Krofft

Originally, copyright laws in the United States mostly covered works of writing. 32 While music
copyright slowly became recognized in courts during the 19th century,33 it was not until 1946 in
Arnstein v. Porter that a truly definitive test for what constituted music copyright was
developed.34 In this groundbreaking case, the court stated that since it is hard to determine
copyright infringement through direct copying, a two-prong test should be used instead.35 The
first part of the Arnstein test uses expert testimony to determine if the two works are similar as a
whole. When two works are considered strikingly similar, access can be inferred.36 The second
prong requires the finder of fact to listen to the two works in the role of a lay-listener and make
their judgement as to if the two works are similar enough to merit infringement.37 Judges have
previously stated that this prong comprises listening for the “groove” or “feel” of the works and
comparing them.

30

Ibid., 114.
Ibid.,” 140.
32
Breyer, “The Uneasy Case for Copyright,” 283 at note 11.
33
J. Michael Keyes, “Musical Musings: The Case for Rethinking Music Copyright Protection,” Michigan
Telecommunications and Technology Law Review 10 (2004): 410-419.
34
Ibid.
35
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946)
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
31
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Arnstein was a very influential case and the two-prong test that resulted from it was what
defined the elements of infringement discussed in Part II A.38 The importance of this case lay not
necessarily on the elucidation of the test itself, but on the fact that it cast the lay listener test as an
economic consideration, meaning that the court “place[d] the primary value of a piece of music
in the portion that makes it popular with, or at least recognizable to, the public.”39 Another
significance of the Arnstein case is that it imposed boundaries on the use of experts, limiting
them to take part only in the copying stage of the test.40
Court rationale in assessing similarity between two works did not change41 until the
milestone Sid & Marty Krofft v. McDonald’s Corp. case in 1977. In this case, the Ninth Circuit
Judge Carter asserted that the court in Arnstein had actually hinted at the concept of the ideaexpression dichotomy when it had made its two-prong test.42 In the decision, the judge argued
that it was a matter of due course to further refine the test into what the Arnstein court had
intended all along and delineated what is now known as the extrinsic-intrinsic test.43 In the
extrinsic-intrinsic test, the court must first look at the extrinsic portion of the work and, through
analytical dissection by an expert, determine if ideas in the original work have been copied in the
new work.44 Experts are used in this portion of the tests because, according to the court, the idea
portion of a work can only be found through objective analysis.45 If ideas have been copied, the
trier of fact must finally determine if there is enough copying of expression to warrant

Cadwell, “Expert Testimony, Scenes a Faire, and Tonal Music,” 130-140.
Ibid., 146.
40
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946)
41
Francis, “Musical Copyright Infringement” 495-496 citing Selle v. Gibb.
42
Krofft v. McDonald’s Corp. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977) “When the court in Arnstein refers to 'copying' which
is not itself an infringement, it must be suggesting copying merely of the work's idea.”
43
Ibid. “But there also must be substantial similarity not only of the general ideas but of the expressions of those
ideas as well. Thus, two steps in the analytic process are implied by the requirement of substantial similarity.”
44
Jones, “The Myth of the Idea/Expression/Dichotomy in Copyright Law,” 581.
45
Kim, “Expert Testimony and Substantial Similarity,” 114-115.
38
39
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infringement.46 Expressions, and not ideas, must be looked at to determine infringement because
of a precedent set in the Supreme Court: Mazer v. Stein stated that “a copyright gives no
exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea—not the
idea itself.”47 The circularity in the court’s language is the root of confusion in how to apply the
Krofft test in music copyright cases.48

III. Inherent Problems in Music Copyright
A. In General

In his Guide to Musical Analysis, Nicholas Cook states that music is “surely among the most
baffling of the arts in its power to move people profoundly whether they have any technical
expertise or intellectual understanding of it.”49 Aaron Copland, the famed American composer,
wrote that music “is the freest, the most abstract, the least fettered of all the arts: no story
content, no pictorial representation… need hamper the intuitive functioning of the imaginative
mind.”50 Indeed, music is harder to grasp and harder to decipher compared to other artistic forms
such as literature and the visual arts. One thing does remain constant. Whether it be divine
providence from up above, or merely the result of an odd evolutionary byproduct, as several

Jones, “The Myth of the Idea Expression/Dichotomy in Copyright Law,” 581.
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
48
Kim, “Expert Testimony and Substantial Similarity,” 114-115.
49
Nicholas Cook, A Guide to Musical Analysis, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 1.
50
Aaron Copland, Music and Imagination (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953), 7.
46
47
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scientists have argued, there is little doubt of the power of music to move.51 However, there is
little agreement on why that is.52
There are several fundamental features that delimit music, such as time, melody, and
harmony. These elements are what are represented in a lead sheet, which is what is often
scrutinized in a music infringement case. Unlike a full score, which includes the notes for the
various vocal or instrumental parts in a composition, a lead sheet typically only contains the
main melody, including its temporal aspects, the harmony indicated by chord symbols, and any
lyrics that a composition may have.
Time in music can be broken into two main components: tempo and rhythm. Tempo
refers to the speed of music, or how fast the “beat” is.53 Rhythm, on the other hand, is a precise
pattern or arrangement of pitches in terms of duration.54
One of the most obvious components of music is melody. Defined as “a sweet or
agreeable succession or arrangement of sounds” by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the melody
is what people typically hum when they refer to a tune.55 A melody can also be thought of as the
tune of a piece and is most memorable about a popular work of music. In Western music, there
are twelve tones that repeat in a cycle. The tones are generally arranged into a scale or key that

51

Oliver Sacks, Musicophilia: Tales of Music and the Brain (United States: Random House, 2007), x-xv. In the
preface, Sacks describes the various intellectual giants who have attempted to draw out the secrets of music. The
book as a whole contains twenty-nine case studies of music’s effect on people; Joanne Lipman, "Is Music the Key to
Success?" The New York Times, accessed March 27, 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/13/opinion/sunday/ismusic-the-key-to-success.html. This article provides anecdotal evidence indicating that those who are successful
have had music as a significant part of their lives, suggesting that there is a certain power to music.
52
Stefan Koelsch, “Emotion and Music,” in Jorge Armony & Patrik Vuilleumier, The Cambridge Handbook of
Human Affective Neuroscience (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013): 299; Copland, Music and
Imagination, 17. Copland professes to have the final say about music: “The precise meaning of music is a question
that should never have been asked, and in any event will never elicit a precise answer.”
53
Justin London, "Tempo (i)," Grove Music Online, Accessed April 10, 2017,
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/27649.
54
Justin London, "Rhythm," Grove Music Online, Accessed April 10, 2017,
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/45963pg1.
55
"Melody," Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Accessed March 27, 2017, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/melody?utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld.
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does not necessarily use all twelve pitches. Western Art music may use additional notes that lie
in between the conventional twelve notes, known as microtones, but they generally do not appear
in popular music.56
Related to melody is harmony, which in the Oxford Dictionary is defined as “The
combination of simultaneously sounded musical notes to produce a pleasing effect.”57 A melody
is a series of notes and can be understood to be placed “horizontally” in time while harmony can
be thought of as placed “vertically,” as multiple notes are played at the same time in a chord.
Another way to consider harmony is like the background that sets the stage in a play where the
main actor known as the melody stands front and center. There are different schools of thought
on how harmonies are arranged. For example, popular music generally uses a form of harmony
with a tonal center, meaning that notes in a scale are given different significance in a hierarchy.58
In this kind of music, chords are played in a specified progression that usually ends in a chord
that feels like “home.”59 Another type of harmonic system is the atonal system, where all twelve
notes are used without any one note being leaned upon.60 Harmony in this type of system is not
usually thought of as a series of chord progressions.
The combination of melody, harmony, time and tempo defines the basic structure of a
work of music. It seems on the surface that an infinite number of arrangements of musical
elements can be made, implying that there should also be an infinite number of music works that
can be written. Since there are so many possible music works, it should be a simple matter for

56

Paul Griffiths, et al, "Microtones," Grove Music Online, Accessed April 10, 2017,
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/18616.
57
"Harmony," Oxford Living Dictionary, Accessed March 27, 2017,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/harmony.
58
Charles Hamm, et al, "Popular Music," Grove Music Online, Accessed April 10, 2017,
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/A2259148.
59
Ibid.
60
"Atonal," The Oxford Dictionary of Music, Accessed April 10, 2017,
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/opr/t237/e617.
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composers to create original works and avoid infringing on others. Clearly, this is not the case.
According to Judge Learned Hand in Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co., “It must be remembered
that, while there are an enormous number of possible permutations of the musical notes of the
scale, only a few are pleasing; and much fewer still suit the infantile demands of the popular
ear.”61 A quandary arises merely from the definitions of harmony and melody used in common
parlance. Both the Merriam-Webster Dictionary and the Oxford Dictionary used terms such as
“pleasing,” “agreeable,” and “pleasant” in their definitions. Humans have vast preferences in
music.62 For example, atonal works such as Alban Berg’s Wozzeck will undoubtedly sound
dissonant to most listeners yet others find it “pleasant,” or at the very least, something worth
listening to despite the dissonance. If a music infringement case arises where the style of music
is alien to the judge or jury, it seems likely that it would be more challenging for the trier of fact
to unearth the needed element of originality or creativity in a plaintiff’s piece. This is because in
the context of copyright, the purpose of which is to incentivize creativity through economic
protection, if a trier of fact simply does not like the music they are hearing, they might assign it
less value than the kind of music they enjoy.
Another issue with attributing infringement in music is conclusively showing what is
original in the plaintiff’s work from an objective standpoint.63 Each genre of music, such as pop,
jazz, or classical music, has recurring combinations of musical tropes that can be labeled as
scènes à faire.64 For instance, a harmonic progression such as I-V-vi-IV is extremely common
and manifests itself in many popular songs.65 These recurring patterns are not protected under

61

Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co., 113 F.2d (2d Cir. 1940)
Koelsch, “Emotion and Music,” 287.
63
Cadwell, “Expert Testimony, Scenes a Faire, and Tonal Music” 149.
64
Ibid., 148-149. Citing Alexander v. Haley which was an infringement case involving works of writing, but this
concept of scènes à faire can be applied to music.
65
“The Four Chords of Pop,” TV Tropes, accessed April 11, 2017,
http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/TheFourChordsOfPop.
62
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copyright as they do not have the element of originality because they are considered scènes à
faire.66 To determine if there has been infringement, a trier of fact would have to identify not
only what attributes are shared between the two works in question, but also figure out whether or
not the copied part has been derived from or is part of typical patterns seen within the genre of
the work—and this is no easy task. 67
Another issue with music copyright is the medium in which the musical work is
protected. In the current U.S. system, a composer must submit a deposit copy as part of the
process to register a copyright.68 The copyright court prefers a printed copy over a sound
recording, but accepts either.69 While composers of published works created on or after January
1, 1978 are expected to submit a full score and parts, the Copyright Office had accepted less
complete versions such as lead sheets70 before that date.71 A problem arises at this point in the
copyright system as lead sheets generally reflect the barebones of a composition and do not
necessarily include all the specific musical details that would characterize a specific performance
of the work. Since the ownership of a copyright is based on the deposit copy, if two works are
being scrutinized based on just the lead sheets, the basic nature of both works can lead to the
perceived existence of similarities when there are actually none, such as in the Blurred Lines
case.

Cadwell, “Expert Testimony, Scenes a Faire, and Tonal Music,” 148-149.
See “Jazz Has Got Copyright Law and That Ain’t Good,” Harvard Law Review 118 (2005): 1940-1961. This
article describes the particular problems that arise when attempting to apply broad copyright conceptions onto a
specific genre like jazz. Because jazz performances are based on “standards,” on which improvisations is expected,
jazz performers do not usually gain the protection of copyright because in the eyes of the law, this kind of borrowing
does not contain a minimum level of creativity or originality.
68
“Copyright Registration for Musical Compositions,” United States Copyright Office, accessed March 27, 2017,
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ50.pdf.
69
Ibid.
70
Lead sheets are a simplified form of musical notation that only contains the essential elements of a song such as
the lyrics, the chord progression, and main melody.
71
“Copyright Registration for Musical Compositions,” United States Copyright Office, accessed March 27, 2017,
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ50.pdf.
66
67
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The fact that the Copyright Office also accepts sound recordings of the work poses
another issue. When experts make their arguments, they are expected to rely on the deposit
copy—whatever its form. However, if the deposit copy for a work is a recording or merely a lead
sheet, some experts create their own transcription of the work, and in the case of a lead sheet,
this may be based on an outside sound recording.72 A situation can occur where an expert may
create the transcription in such a way as to make the two works more or less similar than they
might have been otherwise. Similarly, an expert could play the two works from written deposit
copies on a keyboard during the trial to make them sound similar, as the judge in Arnstein
noted.73 This problem is due to the mixing of different ways of storing music as well as certain
preferences on what music is. Is the copyrighted musical work the score or is it the sound that
one hears when it is performed or played from a recording?

72

Judith Greenberg Finell, "Using an Expert Witness in a Music Copyright Case," Judith Finell Music Services Inc.,
Accessed March 27, 2017, http://www2.jfmusicservices.com/using-an-expert-witness-in-a-music-copyright-case/.
73
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); Jamie Lund, “An Empirical Examination of the Lay Listener Test
in Music Composition Copyright Infringement,” Social Science Research Network, accessed March 27, 2017,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2030509 at 39. Lund discusses the results of an experiment in which participants were
asked to evaluate a pair of songs that were in a copyright litigation case. The participants were split into two groups,
one of which heard the songs performed similarly with the same timbre, orchestration, and style. The other group
heard the same pair of songs performed dissimilarly. The experiment suggested that those who heard the songs
played similarly were more likely to assess the two songs as similar while the opposite was true of those who heard
the songs played dissimilarly.
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B. The Pervading Influence of the Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright

In his 1990 Pace Law Review article, Richard Jones74 states that “fundamental to traditional
copyright doctrine is the claim that copyright only protects an author’s particular expression of
an idea and never the idea itself.”75 According to Jones, the dichotomy would at best be an
unnecessary step in copyright cases while at worst, serve to confuse and mislead the trier of
fact.76 This concept, known as the idea-expression dichotomy, was originally applied to literal
copying, such as between two bookkeeping systems, and became explicit in 1880 in Baker v.
Selden, in which the court ruled that while the plaintiff’s specific form of bookkeeping was
protected as an expression, he only had copyright on the exact arrangement of columns and rows
and not the general idea of a bookkeeping system.77
The idea-expression dichotomy was later applied to non-literal copying by Judge Learned
Hand.78 In his opinion in Nichols v. Universal Pictures, Inc., Judge Learned Hand described
what is now called the abstraction test to help sort the difference between idea and expression
between two plays: “Upon any work . . . a great number of patterns of increasing generality will
fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. [H]ere is a point in this series of
abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the
use of his ideas.”79 The expansion of the idea-expression doctrine continued and was eventually
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codified in the Copyright Act of 1976 which stated that “In no case does copyright protection for
an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery.”80
Jones acknowledges that there has been a lot of criticism of the idea-expression
dichotomy but most miss the most crucial issue.81 The first problem with the idea-expression
dichotomy is defining each term. At what point does an idea become an expression? Judge
Learned Hand certainly attempted to elucidate it with his abstraction test but even then, the test
did not provide a definitive answer, recognizing that the point of importance differs depending
on the context. Despite Judge Hand’s attempt, courts are still inconsistent in their use of
“expression” or “idea.”82 In fact, the distinction between expression and idea is practically
nonexistent because of the circularity in which they are defined.83 “Expression” may refer to any
and all incorporation of an idea or it can refer only to protectable ideas.84 “Idea” is often defined
in relation to an “expression.”85 Just like ambiguity present in what music is “pleasing” and
therefore more likely to be protected, the ambiguity of idea versus expression is also prone to the
influence of the trier of fact’s natural values and preferences.
Even if courts were consistent in their use of “expression” and “idea,” the prime issue
that Jones brings to the forefront is the notion that an “idea cannot exist apart from some
expression.”86 In simple terms, the moment a person has an idea, it is already expressed as a
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human conception.87 An example that Jones uses to illustrate the problem is in writing. Jones
asserts that the substance or central message of a writing cannot be changed without inevitably
changing the form of the writing because “the form does not add something to an idea existing
independently of all expression.”88 For example, titles, slogans, and catch phrases are typically
viewed as “ideas” by courts and therefore unprotectable; yet these objects are expression since
they are formed from tangible words.89

C. Blurred Lines

As the Blurred Lines case took place in California, it fell under the jurisdiction of the
Ninth Circuit, which applies the Krofft test in copyright cases.90 During the court proceedings,
Judith Finell,91 the Gaye family’s expert witness, submitted a preliminary report that outlined
eight similarities between the two works and why she thought there was substantial similarity
between “Blurred Lines” and “Got to Give It Up.”92 These features are:93
1. signature phrase in main vocal melodies.
2. hooks.
3. hooks with backup vocals.
4. core theme, or “Theme X.”
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5. backup hooks.
6. bass melodies.
7. keyboard parts.
8. unusual percussion choices.
The expert on Williams’ side, Sandy Wilbur,94 submitted a 55-page declaration that
included a comparative analysis of the songs in question as well as a critique of Finell’s
preliminary report.95 One of Wilbur’s criticisms was that “Finell’s ‘eight similarities are primary
melodic,’ but ‘[t]here are not two consecutive notes in any of the melodic examples in the Finell
report that have the same pitch, the same duration, and the same placement in the measure.”96
Wilbur also wrote that many of the similarities that Finell had found were unoriginal and were
found in many songs prior to the two works in question. A declaration by Ingrid Monson,97
another expert fielded by the Gaye family as well as a follow-up declaration by Finell critiqued
Wilbur’s statements in turn.98 Monson disagreed that several works that Wilbur had claimed
were prior art had much in common with “Got to Give it up.”99 Finell, on the other hand,
rebuked Wilbur, stating that her analysis was equivalent to “deconstruct[ing] and
microscopically dissect[ing] the individual similar features in isolation, outside the context of the
entire work.”100
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One instance of substantial similarity asserted by Finell is the sharing of a signature
phrase.101 In her initial report, Finell described five points of similarity between the two signature
phrases. These are:102
1. Both repeat their starting tone several times.
2. Both contain the identical scale degree sequence of 5-6-1 followed by 1-5. Finell
defines a “scale degree” as “the position in a particular scale of each tone,” and states
that “[t]wo melodies containing a similar series of scale degrees with similar rhythms
usually sound similar.”
3. Both contain identical rhythms for the first six tones.
4. Both use the same device of a melodic “tail” (melisma) on their last lyric, beginning
with the scale degrees 1-5. Finell defines a “melisma” as “a vocal melody in which one
syllable or lyric is held while sung with several successive pitches, rather than a single
pitch for each syllable.”
5. Both contain substantially similar melodic contours (melodic outlines/design)
Finell also provided a transcription of the two phrases in question:
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In her declaration, Wilbur stated that she found no similarities between the signature
phrases transcribed by Finell, stating that only one note in both phrases has the same pitch and
placement.103 Finell fought back by arguing that Wilbur was taking a literal approach in her
methodology and that she “fails to consider the overall role of the signature phrase in the
songs.”104 Which expert is correct?
Judith Finell used a variety of techniques, one of which is akin to Schenkerian analysis,
to assert the existence of substantial similarity in the two signature phrases. Schenkerian analysis
is an investigative technique that is accepted, taught, and used in today’s academic circles.105 In
using Schenkerian analysis, a musician can purportedly distill a piece of music into its purest
form harmonically and melodically.106 Schenkerian analysis is based on finding tones of
elaboration based on a pre-established hierarchy of levels and gradually removing them, leaving
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only the bare essence of the piece. In Paul Grinvalsky’s107 words from his 1991 California
Western Law Review article, “the resulting visual aid, preserves a generalized statement of what
the piece is about (the idea) upon which the composer articulated his particular elaboration (the
treatment or expression of the idea).”108 Schenkerian analysis creates a series of abstractions
almost exactly like Judge Learned Hand’s abstraction test. An example of Schenkerian analysis
is shown below:109

The investigation done regarding ‘b’ found in Example 1A about the signature phrase by
Finell is not Schenkerian but it is based on a similar process of reducing and eliminating
extraneous information as stated during the second day of trial proceedings.110 This picking and
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choosing of notes can be seen in the second point of similarity, that Finell identifies as ‘b’, which
is that both songs contain an identical sequence of scale degrees of 5-6-1 followed by 1-5. Scale
degree 2, which is placed squarely between the 5-6-1 and 1-5 sequence in “Got to Give It Up” is
glossed over by Finell and thus not mentioned in her points of similarity.111 This could be
because scale degree 2 is a dissonant note starting on a weak beat of the measure, therefore
lowering its significance. One problem with ignoring the scale degree 2 in Musical Example 1A
(“Got to Give It Up”) is that it could imply dominant harmony leading into the second measure;
dominant harmony is not implied in Musical Example 1B (“Blurred”). Finell also overlooks the
fact that both segments begin on different scale degrees, with “Got to Give It Up” starting on
scale degree 5 and “Blurred Lines” starting on scale degree 3. Differences in scale degrees are
usually seen as significant in music especially if focusing only on the melodic aspect of the
music.
Another instance where scale degree matters is in the melisma. In “Blurred Lines,” the
melisma is written using scale degrees 1, 5, 4, and 3. This melisma is essentially an arpeggiation
of the tonic triad that is filled using scale degree 4. While it the melisma in “Got to Give It Up”
does start with and share scale degrees 1 and 5 with the melisma in “Blurred Lines,” the presence
of scale degree 6 at the end makes it more harmonically ambiguous. Moreover, the melodic
contour is different in the melismas; the melisma in “Got to Give It Up” has a down and up
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motion while the melisma in “Blurred Lines” only has a downward motion. The differences in
analysis rest on what level of detail the experts use. In this case, Finell only wrote about the scale
degree similarities between two melismas in the signature phrase.
At what level of detail should an expert look at the melodic contour? Similar to the
previous point, the similarity is dependent on the level of abstraction or detail that is used. For
example, Finell claimed that the phrase in both pieces contained substantially similar melodic
contours. If the level of abstraction in determining the contour is defined as “does the melody
end on a higher or lower note than it started?” then Finell would be correct that the melodic
contour of the first six notes is similar. If the level of abstraction used is slightly more detailed
and is defined as “does the melody end on a higher or lower than it started, and where is the
middle note in relation to the first and last note of the melodic sequence?” then Finell’s argument
about the substantial similarity of the melodic contours would be much weaker. A more detailed
look at the signature phrase that makes a distinction between the contour of the section labeled
‘c’ in example 1 and the contour of melisma labeled ‘d’ would note the differences mentioned
above.
The second point regarding the hook that Finell made also points to the difference in
levels of examination that experts can make. Finell defined a hook as “the most important
melodic material of the work, that which becomes the memorable melody by which the song is
recognized.”112 In the example shown below, Finell asserts that because three of the four notes in
the hook are the same scale degrees, they are substantially similar:113
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However, the example submitted by Wilbur paints a completely different picture. As
shown below, Finell chose to disregard the metric placement of the signature hooks—a
difference that can completely change how it sounds.114 Wilbur also correctly notes that the
omission of the melisma following the hook in “Blurred Lines” can give a misleading impression
of similarity.115 Finally, as Wilbur highlights, the only unique note in the four-note hook, scale
degree 2, that Finell conjured, is actually significant because it adds tension to the hook.116
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The kind of analysis that Finell and Wilbur did is in accordance with the idea-expression
dichotomy. Within this context, experts try to reveal the “true” essence of the songs they are
tasked to analyze. The main area of contention between the experts of each side as illustrated in
Blurred Lines was implicitly a debate on what level of abstraction and detail the works should be
looked at.117 However, the kind of analysis allowed by the idea-expression dichotomy, in which
chopped-up pieces of music can be served without context, allows experts to cook up a medley
of misleading statements. This opens the door for Finell and other experts to insert their own
biases and preferences into what the core of the work is, making the extrinsic, “objective”
portion of the test, just another test of subjectivity.

IV. Conclusion

Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of the Gaye family, setting a precedent that has been viewed
as having the potential to stifle creativity in the arts.118 Just as Jones foresaw, the judgement was
“not clarified by introducing the jargon of the idea-expression dichotomy.”119 Not once in the
declarations submitted by experts in the court proceedings did any expert mention whether the
parts that were identified as substantially similar were creative or original—the judge who read
the declarations did not mention them in his opinion.
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Jones asserted that the only relevant elements in an infringement case are already
included.120 These elements: creativity and originality are already part of a formula for striking
similarity theorized by John Autry in his 2002 Journal of Intellectual Property Law article.121
Based on his findings, Autry’s criteria on what similarity means are creativity and identity.122
Furthermore, the distinguishing factor between striking similarity and substantial similarity is
quantity.123 If courts were simply able to sick the hounds (experts) on tangible elements of the
music instead of having them hare off to abstract-la-la-land, controversial results like in Blurred
Lines may not have occurred. It is true that in musical terms, Finell would have had to try to
include additional material based on the recording that was not found in the lead sheet deposit
copy. However, current copyright deposit requirements are much more stringent, preferring a full
score of a musical work versus a lead sheet or even a sound recording.124 With higher quality
scores instead of lead sheets to argue an infringement case from, there would be fewer
opportunities for experts to interpret and thus potentially manufacture evidence that may not be
legitimate, leading to fairer results.
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